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This paper analyzes the robustness properties of 2D chaotic map image encryption schemes. We investigate the behavior of such
block ciphers under diﬀerent channel error types and find the transmission error robustness to be highly dependent on the type
of error occurring and to be very diﬀerent as compared to the eﬀects when using traditional block ciphers like AES. Additionally,
chaotic-mixing-based encryption schemes are shown to be robust to lossy compression as long as the security requirements are
not too high. This property facilitates the application of these ciphers in scenarios where lossy compression is applied to encrypted
material, which is impossible in case traditional ciphers should be employed. If high security is required chaotic mixing loses its
robustness to transmission errors and compression, still the lower computational demand may be an argument in favor of chaotic
mixing as compared to traditional ciphers when visual data is to be encrypted.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A significant amount of encryption schemes specifically tai-
lored to visual data types has been proposed in literature dur-
ing the last years (see [9, 20] for extensive overviews). The
most prominent reasons not to stick to classical full encryp-
tion employing traditional ciphers like AES [6] for such ap-
plications are the following:
(i) to reduce the computational eﬀort (which is usually
achieved by trading oﬀ security as it is the case in par-
tial or soft encryption schemes);
(ii) to maintain bitstream compliance and associated func-
tionalities like scalability (which is usually achieved
by expensive parsing operations and marker avoidance
strategies);
(iii) to achieve higher robustness against channel or storage
errors.
Using invertible two-dimensional chaotic maps (CMs)
on a square to create symmetric block encryption schemes
for visual data has been proposed [4, 8] mainly to serve the
first purpose, that is, to create encryption schemes with low
computational demand. CMs operate in the image domain
which means that in some sense bitstream compliance is not
an issue, however, they cannot be combined in a straightfor-
ward manner with traditional compression techniques.
Compensating errors in transmission and/or storage of
data, especially images, is fundamental to many applications.
One example is digital video broadcast or RF transmissions
which are also prone to distortions from atmosphere or in-
terfering objects. On the one hand, eﬀective error conceal-
ment techniques already exist for most current file formats,
but when image data needs to be encrypted, these techniques
only partly apply since they usually depend on the data for-
mat which is not accessible in encrypted form. On the other
hand, error correction codes may be applied at the network
protocol level or directly to the data but these techniques ex-
hibit several drawbacks which may be not acceptable in cer-
tain application scenarios.
(i) Processing overhead: applying error correction codes
before transmission causes additional computational
demand which is not desired if the acquiring and send-
ing device has limited processing capability (like any
mobile device).
(ii) Data rate increase: error correction codes add redun-
dancy to data; although this is done in a fairly eﬃcient
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manner, data rate increase is inevitable. In case of low-
bandwidth network links (like any wireless network)
this may not be desired.
One famous example for an application scenario of that
type are RF surveillance cameras with their embedded pro-
cessors, which are used to digitize the signal and encrypt it
using state-of-the-art ciphers. If further error correction can
be avoided, the remaining processing capacity (if any) can be
used for image enhancement and higher network capacity al-
lows better quality images to be transmitted. In this work we
investigate a scenario where neither error concealment nor
error correction techniques are applied, the encrypted visual
data is transmitted as it is due to the reasons outlined above.
Due to intrinsic properties (e.g., the avalanche eﬀect)
of cryptographically strong block ciphers (like AES), such
techniques are very sensitive to channel errors. Single bits
lost or destroyed in encrypted form cause large chunks of
data to be lost. For example, it is well known that a single
bit failure of AES-encrypted ciphertext destroys at least one
whole block plus further damage caused by the encryption
mode architecture. Permutations have been suggested to be
used in time-critical applications since they exhibit signif-
icantly lower computational cost as compared to other ci-
phers, however, this comes at a significantly reduced security
level (this is the reason why applying permutations is said
be a type of “soft encryption”). Hybrid pay-TV technology
has extensively used line permutations (e.g., in the Nagravi-
sion/Syster systems), many other suggestions have been made
to employ permutations in securing DCT-based [21, 22] or
wavelet-based [14, 23] data formats. In addition to being very
fast, permutations have been identified to be a class of cryp-
tographic techniques exhibiting extreme robustness in case
transmission errors occur [19].
Bearing in mind that CM crypto systems mainly rely on
permutations makes them interesting candidates for the use
in error-prone environments. Taken this fact together with
the very low computational complexity of these schemes,
wireless and mobile environments could be potential appli-
cation fields. While the expected conclusion that the higher
security level of cryptographically strong ciphers implies
higher sensitivity to errors compared to CM crypto systems
is nothing new, we investigate the impact of diﬀerent error
models on image quality to obtain a quantifiable tradeoﬀ be-
tween security and transmission error robustness. The rise of
wireless local area networks and its diversity of errors enforce
the development of new transmission methods to achieve
good quality of transmitted image data at a certain protec-
tion level.
Accepting the drawback of a possibly weaker protection
mechanism, it may be possible to achieve better quality re-
sults in the decrypted image after transmission over noisy
channels as compared to classical ciphers. In this work we
compare the impact of diﬀerent types of distortions of trans-
mission links (i.e., channel errors) on the transmission of im-
ages using block cipher encryption with CM encryption (see
Figure 1, part A).
Additionally (see Figure 1, part B), we focus on an is-
sue diﬀerent to those discussed so far at first sight, however,
this topic is related to the CMs’ robustness against a specific
type of errors (value errors): we investigate the lossy com-
pression of encrypted visual material [10]. Clearly, data en-
crypted with classical ciphers cannot be compressed well: due
to the statistical properties of encrypted data no data reduc-
tion may be expected using lossless compression schemes,
lossy compression schemes cannot be employed since the re-
constructed material cannot be decrypted any more due to
compression artifacts. For these reasons, compression is al-
ways required to be performed prior to encryption when
classical ciphers are used. However, for certain types of ap-
plication scenarios it may be desirable to perform lossy com-
pression after encryption (i.e., in the encrypted domain).
CMs are shown to be able to provide this functionality to a
certain extent due to their robustness to random value errors.
We will experimentally evaluate diﬀerent CM configurations
with respect to the achievable compression rates and quality
of the decompressed and decrypted visual data.
A brief introduction to chaotic maps and their respec-
tive advantages and disadvantages as compared to classical
ciphers is given in Section 2. Experimental setup and used
image quality assessment methods are presented in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses the robustness properties of CM block ci-
phers with respect to diﬀerent types of network errors and
compares the results to the respective behavior of a classi-
cal block cipher (AES) in these environments. Section 5 dis-
cusses possible application scenarios requiring compression
to be performed after encryption and provides experimental
results evaluating a JPEG compression, a JPEG 2000 com-
pression and finally JPEG 2000 with wavelet packets, all with
varying quality applied to CM encrypted data. Section 6 con-
cludes the paper.
2. CHAOTIC MAP ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
Using CMs as a (mainly) permutation-based symmetric
block cipher for visual data was introduced by Scharinger
[17] and Fridrich [8]. CM encryption relies on the use of dis-
crete versions of chaotic maps. The good diﬀusion properties
of chaotic maps, such as the baker map or the cat map, soon
attracted cryptographers. Turning a chaotic map into a sym-
metric block cipher requires three steps, as [8] points out.
(1) Generalization. Once the chaotic map is chosen, it
is desirable to vary its behavior through parameters.
These are part of the key of the cipher.
(2) Discretization. Since chaotic maps usually are not dis-
crete, a way must be found to apply the map onto a
finite square lattice of points that represent pixels in an
invertible manner.
(3) Extension to 3D. As the resulting map after step two is a
parameterized permutation, an additional mechanism
is added to achieve substitution ciphers. This is usually
done by introducing a position-dependent gray level
alteration.
In most cases a final diﬀusion step is performed, often
achieved by combining the data line or column wise with the
output of a random number generator.
















Figure 1: Experimental setup examining (A) transmission error resistance and (B) lossy compression robustness of CM and AES encryption
schemes.
The most famous example of a chaotic map is the stan-
dard baker map:




















≤ x ≤ 1.
(1)
This corresponds geometrically to a division of the unit
square into two rectangles [0, 1/2[×[0, 1] and [1/2, 1]×[0, 1]
that are stretched horizontally and contracted vertically. Such
a scheme may easily be generalized using k vertical rectangles
[Fi−1Fi[×[0, 1[ each having an individual width pi such that
Fi =
∑ i
j=1pj , F0 = 0,Fk = 1. The corresponding vertical
rectangle sizes pi, as well as the number of iterations, intro-
duced parameters. Another choice of a chaotic map is the
Arnold Cat map:











where x mod 1 denotes the fractional part of a real num-
ber x by subtracting or adding an appropriate integer. This
chaotic map can be generalized using a Matrix A introduc-
ing two integers a, b such that det(A) = 1 as follows:





mod 1, A =
(
1 a
b ab + 1
)
. (3)
Now each generalized chaotic map needs to be modified
to turn into a bijective map on a square lattice of pixels. Let
N := {0, . . . ,N − 1}, the modification is to transform do-
main and codomain to N 2. Discretized versions should avoid
floating point arithmetics in order to prevent an accumula-
tion of errors. At the same time they need to preserve sen-
sitivity and mixing properties of their continuous counter-
parts. This challenge is quite ambitious and many questions
arise, whether discrete chaotic maps really inherit all impor-
tant aspects of chaos by their continuous versions. An im-







∣ f (i/N , j/N)− F(i, j)∣∣ = 0. (4)
Discretizing a chaotic Cat map is fairy simple and intro-
duced in [4]. Instead of using the fractional part of a real
number, the integer modulo arithmetic is adopted:
Cdisc : N 2 −→ N 2,
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Finally, an extension to 3D is inserted that may be applied
to any two-dimensional chaotic map. As all chaotic maps
preserve the image histogram (and with it all correspond-
ing statistical moments), a procedure to result in a uniform
histogram after encryption is desired. The extension of a two
dimensional discrete chaotic map F : N 2→N 2 to three di-
mensions consists of a position-dependent grey-level shift
(assuming L grey levels L := {0, . . . ,L − 1}) at each level
of iteration:
F3D : N 2 ×L −→ N 2 ×L
F3D
(




















The map h modifies the grey level of a pixel and is a function
of the initial position and initial grey level of the pixel, that
is, h(i, j, gi j) = gi j + h(i, j) mod L. There are various possible
choices of h, we use h(i, j) = i· j.
Since chaotic maps after step two or three are bijections
of a square lattice of pixels, an additional spreading of lo-
cal information over the whole image is desirable. Otherwise
the cipher is extremely vulnerable to known plaintext attacks,
since each pixel in the encrypted image corresponds exactly
to one pixel in the original. The diﬀusion step is often real-
ized as a linewise process, for example,
v(i, j)∗ = v(i, j) + G(v(i, j − 1)∗)mod L, (7)
where v(i, j) is the not-yet modified pixel at position (i, j),
v(i, j)∗ is the modified pixel at that position, and G is an ar-
bitrarily chosen random lookup table.
Concerning robustness against transmission errors, CMs
of course are expected to be more robust when diﬀusion steps
are avoided (compare results). If local information is spread
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Table 1: Cardinality of key spaces K(N).
N = 20 N = 25 N = 128 N = 512
Baker map keyset1 83343 571 1031 10126
Baker map keyset2 524288 16777216 1038 10153
Cat map 400 625 16384 262144
AES128 1038 1038 1038 1038
AES256 1077 1077 1077 1077
during encryption, that is, in diﬀusion steps, a single pixel
error in the encrypted image causes several pixel errors in the
original image. For this reason, we investigate both settings
with and without diﬀusion.
It should be clear that chaotic maps have diﬀerent prop-
erties when compared to conventional block ciphers. Typi-
cally, conventional block encryption schemes like AES work
on block sizes of 128, 256, or 512 bit. key space contains 2n
elements, where n is the number of key bits, which is usually
often 1 : 1 to block size.
As the main property of CM is permutation, it operates
on larger units, that are full (square) images. Their smallest
element to be permuted is a pixel. To encrypt an N × N im-
age, N2! permutations exist. However, the key space available
to parameterize the chaotic map is often orders of magni-
tude smaller. Another drawback is dependency on image size.
There are configurations where a small change in image size
causes key space to shrink dramatically (see keyset1 and key-
set2 in Table 1). In Table 1, cardinalities of key spaces K(N)
for Baker map, Cat map, and AES are compared choosing a
representative N ×N grey-scale image. While the number of
iterations and parameters for the diﬀusion step is usually part
of the key for chaotic encryption algorithms they have been
neglected for this comparison. It is evident that key space, es-
pecially for smaller image sizes, is insuﬃcient. In this case or
for problematic image sizes, padding should be used to pre-
vent a guessing of all possible key combinations. At this point
a main drawback of the Cat map becomes evident: its pa-
rameters oﬀer little combinations compared to other chaotic
maps.
Chaotic maps are generally sensitive to initial conditions
and parameters. But some discrete versions bear unexpected
behavior when using similar keys. While classical encryp-
tion algorithms are sensitive to keys, chaotic maps such as
the Baker map exhibit a set of keys S(K) for each key K ,
such that the image encrypted with K and decrypted using
k ∈ S(K), k =K is close to its original. We get similar results
when using keys that are derived from the original by replac-
ing a large parameter by two smaller ones or merging two
small parameters into a larger one. This has been observed
by [8]. Accepting the drawback of a further limitation of key
space (the intruder may be content to find a key that pro-
duces acceptable approximations of original images and con-
tinues with refinement), this may also be seen as a feature of
the encryption system. Transmission errors destroying single
bits of the key do not necessarily lead to fully destroyed de-
cryption. Heuristics could produce a similar key, that allows
decryption at a low but probably suﬃcient quality.




3DCatMap Cat map with 3D extension
2DCatDiﬀ Cat map with diﬀusion step
AES128ECB AES using ECB on 128 bit blocks
AES128CBC Same as AES128ECB, using CBC
Table 3: Tested image encryption algorithms for part B.
Name Description
2DCatMap5/7/10 Cat map with 5/7/10 iterations
2DCatDiﬀ5 Cat map with diﬀusion step and five iterations
3DCatMap5 Cat map with 3D extension and five iterations
2DBMap5/17 Baker map with 5/17 iterations








We analyze both transmission error resistence (part A) and
compression robustness (part B) of three diﬀerent flavors of
the chaotic Cat map algorithm, a simple 2D version of the
Baker map and AES using diﬀerent block encryption modes
(see Tables 2, 3). All chaotic ciphers use 10 iteration rounds,
if not specified diﬀerently.
Since the number of iterations used in CM algorithms
largely aﬀects the distribution of distortions caused by lossy
compression, we examine the impact of this parameter on
image quality. The diﬀusion step has been excluded from all
chaotic maps, except CatDiﬀ. All algorithms are applied to a
set of 10 natural and 6 synthetic 256 × 256 images with 256
grey levels referenced in Figure 2 (only 13 of 16 pictures are
shown due to copyright restrictions) using two sets of rep-
resentative encryption keys (keyset2 represents a strong key
whereas keyset1 exhibits certain weaknesses with respect to
security). Key parameters for the visual quality experiment
are given in Table 4.
3.1. Setup
A flow chart to illustrate the test procedure for both part A
and part B is depicted in Figure 1. Recapitulating, the test
procedure is as follows.
(i) Part A: transmission error robustness. After encryption,
a specific type of error as introduced in Section 4.1 is
applied to the encrypted image data. Finally, the image
is decrypted and the result is compared to the original.
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(ii) Part B: compression robustness. After encryption, three
diﬀerent compression algorithms (JPEG, JPEG 2000,
and JPEG 2000 with wavelet packets) are applied to
the encrypted image data. To assess the behavior of the
described processing pipeline, the image is finally de-
compressed, decrypted and the result is compared to
the original image and the achieved compression ratio
(using the encrypted image as reference) is recorded.
3.2. Image quality assessment
It is diﬃcult to find reliable tools to measure quality of dis-
torted images. This is especially true in a low-quality sce-
nario. Several metrics exist, such as the signal-to-noise ra-
tio (SNR), peak SNR (PSNR), or mean-square error (MSE),
which are frequently used in quantifying distortions (see
[3, 7]). Mao and Wu [11] propose a measure specifically tai-
lored to encrypted imagery that separates evaluation of lumi-
nance and edge information into a luminance similarity score
(LSS) and an edge similarity score (ESS), reflecting properties
of the human visual system. According to the authors, this
measure is well suited for assessing distortion of low-quality
images. LSS behaves in a way very similar to PSNR. ESS is
the more interesting part in the context of the survey pre-
sented here, as it reflects the extent for structural distortion.
ESS is computed by block-based gradient comparison and
ranges, with increasing similarity, between 0 and 1. However,
reliable assessment of low-quality images should be made by
human observers in a subjective rating as this cannot be ac-
complished in a sensible way using the metrics above. Subjec-
tive visual assessment of transmissions yields a mean opin-
ion score (MOS) [1] evaluating gradings of human observers
according to strictly specified testing conditions. Such con-
ditions are specified in, for example, [2] for the subjective
assessment of the quality of television pictures. These meth-
ods can be extended to the assessment of images in general
and are frequently adopted, such as in [5]. Recommendation
ITU-R-BT500-11 [2] introduces both double stimulus (with
reference picture) and single stimulus (without reference pic-
ture) assessment methods with a strictly defined testing envi-
ronment, that is, quality and impairment scales, lighting con-
ditions and also restrictions regarding selection of observers.
We have decided to adopt only a subset of features, in partic-
ular,
(i) we adopt to a simultaneous double stimulus method
(SDSCE) with reference and test pictures being shown
at the same time;
(ii) we employ the specified five-graded quality scale (see
Table 5).
Additionally, we conform the specified condition, that at
least fifteen subjects, nonexperts, should be employed.
Since [2] specifies subjective video quality assessment
methods, it should be noticed that observers evaluate the av-
erage quality of the frames displayed. In our case still images
are evaluated. Therefore, we let the observer vote for the av-
erage quality of three diﬀerent test pictures (encrypted using
the same algorithm, but diﬀerent keys) with respective origi-







nals being shown at the same time, that is, in one assessment
step, using the quality levels introduced in Table 5.
In the following section we give a short description of
the observed results with respect to distortions. In order to
complement the subjective ratings, we also report the refer-
ence PSNR value. While it is clear, that in some cases further
error correction by means of denoising might be useful and
thus better results can be achieved, we do not concentrate on
postprocessing techniques at this point.
4. TRANSMISSION ERROR ROBUSTNESS
In this section, our goal is to provide a comparison of two
completely diﬀerent block ciphers with respect to their be-
havior in the transmission of encrypted visual data over noisy
channels. Therefore, this section introduces a set of distor-
tion models we believe are practical and illustrative for ap-
plications.
4.1. Classification of used error models
Much work has already been done to classify transmission
errors occurring at wireless data transmission and a variety
of sophisticated network simulators already exist. To focus
on a generally applicable comparison of the two encryption
mechanisms CM and AES, we arrange simulations that can
be described by the following model: a sender S transmits
a sequence s0, s1, s2, . . . , sn of n + 1 bytes over a lossy chan-
nel. Receiver R receives a sequence r0, r1, r2, . . . , rm of bytes,
that is possibly diﬀerent to s0, s1, s2, . . . , sn. There are situa-
tions where n =m. We identify two categories of observable
errors.
(i) Value errors, where n = m and r0, r1, . . . , rn are derived
from the original sequence alternating selected bytes.
More formally, there exists a set A ⊂ {0, . . . ,n} and
error function f such that for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}
ri =
{
f (si) if i ∈ A;
si else.
(8)
Note that f may depend on additional random variables.
(ii) Buﬀer errors, where bytes are changed, inserted, re-
moved, and possibly resorted. There exists a set A ⊂
{0, . . . ,m} and error function f such that a received
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stream may be described as
∀ j ≤ m ∃i ≤ n : r j =
{
f (si) if j ∈ A;
si else.
(9)
Various combinations of such errors can occur. However, to
extend the observations to existing network behavior, it is in-
evitable to model characteristics of transmission packets and
network protocols. We believe at this point that the intro-
duced classes are suﬃcient to show the main diﬀerences be-
tween the two algorithms CM and AES. Another reason why
further modeling is not adequate at this point is the follow-
ing: if we get close to an error saturation, the category of er-
ror should be negligible, as many small buﬀer errors behave
similar to many value errors.
4.2. Value errors
Proceeding with the notion of an incoming distorted se-
quence r0, r1, . . . , rn, one can identify several diﬀerent subsets
A and functions f to model a value error.
(i) Static error
In this model every single byte will be changed, that is, A =
{0, . . . ,n}. The change for all bytes is quite simple: each byte
gets logically ORed with a static byte b ∈ {0, . . . , 255}. For
our experiments we have assigned to b the value 85. Thus, we
have for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,n} : ri = si OR b. This can be used
to simulate defect bus lines, which are permanently at a high
error level.
(ii) Random error and random Gaussian error
The most general error assumption may be the selection of
A using distribution functions. Having to transmit n bytes,
for each byte si a specifically distributed random variable de-
cides whether i ∈ A or i ∈ A, that is, whether it is trans-
mitted correctly or not. The classes random error and ran-
dom Gaussian error use the uniform distribution and normal
distribution for selection, respectively. Let X∼U(0, 1) be a
(standard, continuous) uniformly distributed random vari-
able and let E∼UD(0, 255) denote a discrete uniformly dis-
tributed random variable, then a random error is defined for
all i ∈ {0, . . . ,n} by
ri =
{
Ei if Xi < p;
si else.
(10)
The choice of p ∈ [0, 1] influences error rate and was selected
to be p = 0.01 for our experiments. For random Gaussian
error the random variable X is chosen to be normally dis-










The assignments for our experiments are as follows: μ = 0,
σ = 1, p = 2.5. This error model is often used to simulate
Table 6: State transitions in Two-State Model.
Probability State transition
p Stay in normal
(1− p) Change to error
q Stay in error
(1− q) Change to normal
distortions in RF transmissions. Moderate rain causes pix-
els in satellite TV transmissions to be distorted using specific
distribution functions.
(iii) Random Markov chain
Similarly to the error model introduced before this model
assumes that a byte is overwritten by a random value if it is
selected to contain an error. But the decision if a byte has an
error is made conforming to a 2-state Markov chain.
Given two states (1 = error and 0 = normal), there
are transition properties to stay or change the current
state. Transitions are handled as shown in Table 6. Espe-
cially for modeling errors in wireless transmission, this
model has frequently been adopted (see, e.g., [13]). Let
X∼U(0, 1),Y∼U(0, 1) be uniformly distributed random
variables and p, q ∈ [0, 1] denote state-transition probabil-
ities as introduced before, then we formulate a state func-
tion returning the current state at time ti with starting state










1 if I(ti) = 0∧ Xi > p
or I(ti) = 1∧ Yi ≤ q;
0 else.
(12)
Thus, if we use again E∼UD(0, 255), we have ∀i ∈ {0,
. . . ,n}:
ri =
{
Ei if I(ti) = 1;
si else.
(13)
For the implemented error model we make the following as-
signments: p = 0.98, q = 0.03, I0 = 0.
4.3. Buffer errors
In contrast to value-errors representatives of the following
type of errors correspond to distortions in packet-switched
data networks. Being able to restore single damaged bytes,
for example, by the employment of error-correcting codes,
the major problem here is a possible perturbation, replaying
and loss of packets consisting of one or multiple bytes.
These errors are often simulated with special network
simulators like ns2 (see at http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns).
Reference [12] shows that these errors happen in bursts
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def random buﬀer()
{
for (i = 0; i < Image.Length; i++)
{
















Algorithm 1: Pseudocode representation of the random buﬀer er-
ror algorithm with an error probability of p.
(subsequently). We do not consider the error in bursts as this
makes an assumption on the transmission channel, and in
the encryption context “real random” errors are the worst
case scenario. As the error may occur inside the destroyed
buﬀer and on the “error edges” (for blockciphers in chain-
ing mode only), we can see that the impact with bursts is less
severe as there are fewer “error edges.”
(i) Random buffer error
The most simple case is when packet size is a single byte. To
model a behavior where each sent byte may be lost, repli-
cated, or finally perturbated in the final sequence the corre-
sponding actions are modeled as random variables. In our
current implementation, only one type of error (add or re-
move of a selected byte) per transmission is possible. The de-
scribed simulation models errors appearing on serial trans-
mission links, where the sender and the receiver are slightly
out of synchronization. Algorithm 1 is a simplified pseu-
docode representation of the implemented algorithm.
(ii) Random packet error
Compared to the random buﬀer error, the random packet
error represents an error which is more likely in current sys-
tems. As practically any modern computer networks (wired
and wireless) are packet switched, packet loss errors, dupli-
cated packets, or out-of-order packets of any common size
can occur during transmissions. Simulation of packet loss
(the most common error) is done by cutting out parts (con-
sisting of an arbitrary number of bytes) of the encrypted im-
age or overwriting them with a specified byte. The imple-
mented algorithm is sketched in Algorithm 2.
def random packet()
{
for (i = 0; i < Image.Length/64; i++)
{














Algorithm 2: Pseudocode representation of the random packet er-
ror algorithm with an error probability of p.
4.4. Experiments
We show the mean opinion scores of 107 (90 male, 17 fe-
male) human observers for the test pictures Lena, Landscape,
and Ossi together with the reference mean PSNR values in
Table 7. The maximum absolute MOS distance between male
and female observers is 0.26 and 0.19 for image-quality ex-
perts versus nonexperts. Especially for random packet errors,
experts tend to grade AES and CM diﬀusion results better,
while finding CM random Gaussian errors to be more both-
ersome.
As can be seen in Table 7, mean PSNR is a good indi-
cator for MOS. Since subjective image assessments are time
consuming (they cannot be automated), we analyze the com-
plete test picture set in Figure 2 with respect to this quality
metric.
It is clear that comparison results largely depend on the
parameters of the error model, such as the error byte b for
static error or the error rate r. Figure 3 depicts exactly this
relationship comparing CM and AES error resilience perfor-
mance against diﬀerent error rates (the plots display average
PSNR values of the images displayed in Figure 2). Inspect-
ing the mean PSNR curves, we can see that for all diﬀer-
ent types of errors, 2DCatMap and 2DBMap do not diﬀer
much, as well as do not diﬀer AES encryption modes. It also
illustrates CMs superiority in transmission error robustness
for random errors. Interestingly, also 3DCatMap performs
equivalently to the pure 2D case for value errors (compare
also Table 6). The results for random buﬀer errors also in-
dicate superiority of CMs, but the low overall PSNR range
obtained does not really lead to visually better results. For
random buﬀer errors, 3DCatMap gives equal results to the
2DCatDiﬀ variant contrasting to the value error cases. For
random packet errors, AES exhibits 1.5–2 dB higher mean
PSNR values than standard 2D CM crypto systems. It is
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Table 7: Comparing AES and CM with respect to objective and subjective image quality using Landscape, Lena, and Ossi test images.
Algorithm
Static error Random error R. Gaussian error R. buﬀer error R. Packet error
Mean PSNR MOS Mean PSNR MOS Mean PSNR MOS Mean PSNR MOS Mean PSNR MOS
Original 13.87 3.10 28.36 4.61 27.53 4.57 10.54 1.39 11.25 2.12
2DCatMap 13.87 3.06 28.34 4.50 27.52 4.56 9.56 1.02 9.73 1.43
2DBMap 13.87 3.07 28.47 4.57 27.37 4.58 9.60 1.00 10.13 1.13
3DCatMap 14.74 2.78 28.43 4.53 27.59 4.56 8.47 1.00 8.92 1.17
2DCatDiﬀ 8.47 1.00 14.24 3.03 13.30 2.75 8.47 1.00 8.46 1.00
AES128ECB 8.52 1.00 16.56 3.21 15.77 3.00 8.58 1.02 10.93 2.40
AES128CBC 8.46 1.00 16.47 3.12 15.63 2.92 8.55 1.04 11.48 2.23
(a) Anton (b) Building (c) Cat
(d) Disney (e) Fractal (f) Gradient
(g) Grid (h) Landscape (i) Lena
(j) Pattern (k) Niagara (l) Tree
(m) Ossi
Figure 2: Test pictures for transmission errors and compression ro-
bustness.
also interesting to see that for AES even at very low error
rates starting at 4-5 percent random errors cause at least
as much damage to image quality than random packet er-
rors. However, when error rates become very high, there is
not much diﬀerence between any of the introduced error
models.
4.4.1. Static error
For simulating the static error case, all bytes are ORed with
b = 85 (Figures 4(a) and 4(b)). It is evident that results for
AES are unsatisfactory. As every byte of the encrypted im-
age is changed, the decrypted image is entirely destroyed re-
sulting in a noise-type pattern. The distortion of the CM-
encrypted image is exactly as significant as if the image had
not been encrypted. The cause for the observable preserva-
tion of the original image is the fact that simple 2D CM is
solely a permutation. In contrast, 3D CM consists of an ad-
ditional color shift depending on pixel positions. Also the 3D
CM handles this type of distortion well whereas the diﬀusion
step added destroys the result. The number of alternately de-
pendent bits can be controlled with the number r of itera-
tion rounds. If just a few rounds are used, an error does not
spread over large parts of the image. Using many rounds, a
single flipping bit causes the scrambling of the entire image.
4.4.2. Random error and random Gaussian error
As we have expected, random error and random Gaussian er-
ror show very similar results. When considering properties of
block ciphers, we can see that the alternation of a single byte
destroys the encrypted block in ECB mode (including a byte
of the following block in CBC/CFB mode). This causes every
error to destroy bs bytes (bs+1 in CBC/CFB) in the decrypted
image, where bs is the used block size (see Figure 5(b)). Fur-
ther errors occurring in already destroyed blocks have no ef-
fect. This leads to stronger impact on block ciphers when pa-
rameters for error probability are small. When the error rate
is high, this drawback is reduced as more and more errors
lie within the same damaged block. The CMs cope very well
with this distortion type since errors are not expanded and
the result is again identical as if the image had not been en-
crypted (see Figure 5(a)). Again, applying diﬀusion is the ex-
ception where degradation may become even more severe as
compared to the AES cases.
4.4.3. Random buffer error
Using random buﬀer error in the AES case, we observe the
following phenomenon. Each time the encrypted blocks get
synchronized with their respective original counterparts, the
following blocks are decrypted correctly until the next error

























































(c) R. packet error
Figure 3: Comparing AES and CM transmission error robustness against error rate.
(a) 2DCatMap (b) AES128ECB
Figure 4: Eﬀect of static byte errors on Lena image.
occurs (see Figure 6(b)). If we use CBC or CFB, the block
directly after the synchronization point SP is additionally de-
stroyed. Of course, this analysis is only correct in case identi-
cal keys are employed for each block.
As we model only insertion or deletion of bytes, we reach
SPs every blocksize (bs) errors. Each time an error occurs we
step either into an error phase, where every pixel is decrypted
incorrectly, or a normal phase (where pixels get decrypted
correctly). Let us assume that for the number of errors e, the




holds. Then we get approximately (bs − 1) times more error
phases than normal phases. If the error rate exceeds the upper
bound, the entire image is destroyed.
The reason why CM-encrypted images are completely
destroyed with random buﬀer error (Figure 6(a)) is the in-
herent sensitivity with respect to initial conditions. In most
cases, neighboring pixels in the encrypted image are far apart
in the decrypted image. Every time an error occurs, the pix-
els are shifted by one and the decrypted pixels are completely
out of place. In CM we cannot identify SPs.
4.4.4. Random packet error
For random packet error we distinguish two diﬀerent ver-
sions:
(1) the packet loss gets detected and the space is padded
with bytes;
(2) no detection of the packet loss is done.
As to the first version we observe, when using AES, that the
lost part plus bs (respective 2× bs) bytes are destroyed. With
2DCatMap and 3DCatMap only the amount of lost pixels is
destroyed. This case corresponds to a value error occurring
in bursts or a local static error, the results obtained show the
respective properties.
In the second case (which is covered in Table 7) CM has
the same synchronization problems as in random buﬀer error
which causes the image to be entirely degraded (Figure 7(a)).
The impact on block ciphers depends on the size of the
packet ps. If the equation
psmod bs = 0 (15)
holds, the error gets compensated very well (shown in
Figure 7(b); this block-type shift can be inverted very eas-
ily). Scrambled parts after the cut points come to bs
(respective 2× bs). If the packet size is diﬀerent, only the
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(a) 2DCatMap (b) AES128ECB
Figure 5: Eﬀect of random byte errors on Lena image.
(a) 2DCatMap (b) AES128CBC
Figure 6: Eﬀect of buﬀer errors on Lena image.
parts of the image lying between synchronization points and
the next error are decrypted correctly.
In normal packet switched networks, the packets need
identification numbers and therefore lost packets can be de-
tected. That is why the first case of random packet errors is
most likely to occur.
Overall we have found excellent robustness of CM with
respect to value errors which results in significantly better be-
havior as compared to classical block ciphers in such scenar-
ios. However, CM cannot be said to be robust against trans-
mission errors in general, since the robustness against buﬀer
errors is extremely low due to the high sensitivity towards
initial conditions of these schemes. Depending on the target
scenario, either CM or classical block ciphers may provide
better robustness properties.
5. COMPRESSION ROBUSTNESS
As already outlined in the introduction, classically encrypted
images cannot be compressed well, because of the typical
properties encryption algorithms have. In particular it is not
possible to employ lossy compression schemes since in this
case potentially each byte of the encrypted image is changed
(and most bytes in fact are), which leads to the fact that the
decrypted image is entirely destroyed resulting in a noise-
type pattern. Therefore, in all applications involving com-
pression and encryption, compression is performed prior to
encryption.
On the other hand, application scenarios exist where a
compression of encrypted material is desirable. In such a sce-
nario classical block or stream ciphers cannot be employed.
For example, dealing with video surveillance systems often
concerns about protecting the privacy of the recorded per-
sons arise. People are afraid what happens with recorded data
allowing to track a persons daily itineraries. A compromise
to minimize impact on personal privacy would be to con-
tinuously record and store the data but only view it, if some
criminal oﬀense has taken place.
To assure that data cannot be reviewed unauthorized, it is
transmitted and stored in encrypted form and only few peo-
ple have the authorization (i.e., the key material) to decrypt
it.
The problem, as depicted in Figure 8, is the amount of
memory needed to store the encrypted frames (due to hard-
ware restrictions of the involved cameras, the data is trans-
mitted in uncompressed form in many cases). For this rea-
son, frames should be stored in a compressed form only.
When using block ciphers, the only way to do this would be
the decryption, compression, and re-encryption of frames.
This would allow the administrator of the storage device to
view and extract the video signal which obviously threatens
privacy. There are two practical solutions to this problem.
(1) Before the image is encrypted and transmitted, it
is compressed. Beside the undesired additional computa-
tional demands for the camera system, this has further disad-
vantages, as transmission errors in compressed images have
usually an even bigger impact without error concealment
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(a) 2DCatMap (b) AES128CBC















Figure 8: Privacy solution for surveillance systems.
strategies enabled. This strategy increases the error rate as
induced by decrypting partially incorrect data even further.
This is prohibitive in environments where the radio signal is
easily distorted.
(2) The encrypted frames are compressed directly. In this
manner, the key material does not have to be revealed when
storing the visual data thereby maintaining the privacy of the
recorded persons. Figuure 8 shows such a system. Clearly, in
this scenario classical encryption cannot be applied. In the
following we will investigate whether CM can be applied and
which results in terms of quality and compression are to be
expected.
A second example where compression of encrypted vi-
sual data is desirable is data transmission over heterogeneous
networks, for example, a transition from wired to wireless
networks with corresponding decreasing bandwidth. Con-
sider the transmission of uncompressed encrypted visual
data in such an environment as occurring in telemedicine
or teleradiology, for example, when changing from the wired
network part to the wireless one, the data rate of the visual
material has to be reduced to cope with the lower bandwidth
available. Employing a classical encryption scheme, the data
has to be decrypted, compressed, and re-encrypted similar
to the surveillance scenario described before. In the network
scenario, these operations put significant computation load
onto the network node in charge for the rate adaptation and
the key material needs to be provided to that network node,
which is demanding in terms of key management. A solution
where the encrypted material may be compressed directly
is much more eﬃcient of course. The classical approach to
tackle this second scenario is to apply format compliant en-
cryption to a scalable or embedded bitstream like JPEG2000.
While this approach solves the question of transcoding in the
encrypted domain in the most elegant manner, the transmis-
sion error robustness problem as discussed for the surveil-
lance scenario remains unsolved.
5.1. Experiments
Based on the observation of the excellent robustness of CM
against value errors, these encryption schemes seem to be
natural candidates to tolerate the application of compression
directly in the encrypted domain without the need for de-
cryption and re-encryption. The reason is that compression
artifacts caused by most lossy compression schemes may be
modeled as random value errors (e.g., errors caused by quan-
tization of single coeﬃcients in JPEG are propagated into the
entire block due to the nature of the DCT). In the follow-
ing, we experiment with applying lossy compression to the
encrypted domain of CM.
5.1.1. JPEG-compression of CM encrypted images
Figures 9–14 show images where the encrypted data got lossy
JPEG compressed [15], decompressed, and finally decrypted
again. In these figures, we provide the quality factor q of the
JPEG compression, the data size of the compressed image in
percent % of the original image size, and the PSNR of the
decompressed and decrypted image given in dB.
In general, we observe quite unusual behavior of the CM
encryption technique. The interesting fact is that despite the
lossy compression, a CM-encrypted image can be decrypted
12 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
(a) q = 55: 36%, 23.4 dB (b) q = 45: 37%, 15.9 dB (c) q = 45: 37%, 9.2 dB
Figure 9: Cat map with 5 iterations (without extensions and using 3D and diﬀusion extensions, resp.), keyset2.
(a) q = 30: 29%, 18.9 dB (b) q = 20: 21%, 16.4 dB (c) q = 10: 13%, 14.5 dB
Figure 10: Cat Map with 5 iterations using diﬀerent compression ratios on the Ossi image, keyset1.
quite well (depending on the compression rate of course). As
already mentioned, this is never the case if classical encryp-
tion is applied.
Figure 9 compares the application of the standard 2D Cat
map without and with additional extensions to increase secu-
rity (i.e., 3D or diﬀusion extensions are employed addition-
ally). At a fixed compression rate (slightly lower than 3), we
obtain a somewhat noisy but clearly recognizable image in
case of no further extensions are used (Figure 9(a)). Apply-
ing the 3D extension to the standard Cat map (Figure 9(b)),
we observe significant degradation of the decrypted image
as compared to the standard Cat map with identical number
of iterations. However, the image content is still recognizable
which is no longer true in case the diﬀusion extension is used;
see Figure 9(c). It is worthwhile noticing that we obtain the
same result, noise, no matter which compression rate or im-
age quality is used in case the diﬀusion step is performed. Ac-
tually this result is identical to a result if a cryptographically
strong cipher like AES had been used instead of Catdiﬀ.
The eﬀect when compression ratio is steadily increased
is shown in Figure 10 on the Ossi test image. Lower data
rates in compression increase the amount of noise in the de-
crypted images, however, still with a compression ratio of
5 (21%) the image is clearly recognizable and the quality
would be suﬃcient for a handhold phone or PDA display, for
example (Figure 10(b)). Of course, higher compression ra-
tios lead to even more severe degradations which are hardly
acceptable for any application (e.g., compression ratio 7.5
in Figure 10(c)). However, higher compression ratios could
be achieved with sensible quality using more advanced lossy
compression schemes like JPEG2000 [18] for example.
Increasing the number of iterations to more than 5 does
not aﬀect the results of the Cat map for a sensible keyset (as
used, e.g., in Figure 9). This is not true for the Baker map
as shown in Figure 11. When using 5 iterations, the com-
pression result is significantly better as compared to the Cat
map case with the same data rate (compare Figure 11(a) to
Figure 9(a)). The reason is displayed in Figure 11(b); using
the Baker map with 5 iterations, we still recognize structures
(horizontal areas of smoothly varying gray values in a single
line) in the encrypted data which means that mixing has not
yet fulfilled its aim to a suﬃcient degree. On the one hand,
this is good for compression since errors are not propagated
to a large extent; on the other hand, this threatens security
since the structures visible in the encrypted data can be used
to derive key data used in the encryption process.
Increasing the number of iterations (e.g., to 17 as shown
in Figures 11(c) and 11(d)) significantly reduces the amount
of visible structures. As it is expected, the compression results
are similar now to the Cat map case using 5 iterations. Using
20 iterations and more, no structures are visible any more
and the compression results are identical to the Cat map
case.
In Figure 12 we give examples of the eﬀects in case patho-
logical key material is used for encryption. When using key-
set 1 for encryption with the Baker map (Figures 12(a) and
12(b)), the structures visible in the encrypted material are
even clearer and in perfect correspondence also the compres-
sion result is superior to that of keyset 2 (Figure 11). With
these setting, an even higher number of iterations are re-
quired to achieve reasonable security (which again destroys
the advantage with respect to compression). Also for the Cat
map, weak keys exist. In Figure 12(d) the encrypted data is
shown in case 10 iterations are performed using keyset 1. In
this case, even image content is revealed and the key param-
eters are reconstructed easily with a ciphertext only attack.
Correspondingly, also the compression results are much bet-
ter as compared to the case when 5 iterations are applied
(see Figure 9(a)). These parameters (weak keys) and corre-
sponding eﬀects (reduced security) have been described in
the literature on CM and have to be avoided for any applica-
tion of course.
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(a) q = 70: 37%, 28.0 dB (b) q = 70: encrypted
(c) q = 60: 36%, 24.9 dB (d) q = 60: encrypted
Figure 11: Baker map with varying number of iterations (5 and 17 iterations), keyset2.
(a) q = 75: 36%, 30.9 dB (b) q = 75: encrypted
(c) q = 70: 36%, 27.3 dB (d) q = 70: encrypted
Figure 12: Baker map and Cat map with pathological keyset1 (5 and 10 iterations).
Applying the Cat map with poor quality keys shows an-
other unique property. While increasing the number of it-
erations increases the security of the Baker map as we have
observed, the opposite can occur for the Cat map for specific
keysets. Accordingly, also compression results are better in
this case for a higher number of iterations. Figure 13 shows
the Ossi image when applying 7 and 10 iterations using key-
set1, while Figure 10(a) shows the case of 5 iterations. Fixing
the data rate, the higher the number of iterations is, the better
the quality gets.
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(a) q = 30: 28%, 19.3 dB, 7 iterations (b) q = 50: 29%, 23.4 dB, 10 iterations
Figure 13: Cat map with 7–10 iterations on the Ossi image, keyset1.
(a) q = 30, 5 iterations (b) q = 30, 7 iterations (c) q = 30, 10 iterations
Figure 14: Cat map with 5–10 iterations on the Ossi image, keyset1, encrypted domain.
The reason for this eﬀect is shown in Figure 14. The more
iterations are applied, the more structural information is vis-
ible and key information may be derived. As shown before
for the Lena image, with 10 iterations in use already image
content is revealed. Of course, due to the higher amount of
coherent structures present in the encrypted domain (espe-
cially exhibited in Figure 14(c)), corresponding compression
can achieve better results.
5.1.2. JPEG 2000-compression of CM encrypted images
We have not only evaluated lossy compression using the
JPEG algorithm but also with JPEG 2000 [18] and JPEG 2000
with wavelet packet decomposition [16] and best basis selec-
tion using log energy as cost function and full decomposi-
tion. Apart from providing visual evidence as shown in the
preceeding subsection, we have also conducted large scale ex-
perimentation using the images shown in Figure 2. Figure 15
shows averaged PSNR results for a decreasing amount of
compression comparing PSNR quality of original images to
three variants of CMs. The results show that the choice of
the algorithm has very little impact on the overall trend of
our results. While diﬀusion entirely destroys robustness to
lossy compression, 2D (as well as 3D variants to some ex-
tent) CMs exhibit a certain amount of robustness against all
sorts of compression. While JPEG2000 with classical pyra-
midal decomposition outperforms the JPEG results by up to
2 dB, the wavelet-packet-based technique performs similar to
JPEG only. It seems that the deep decomposition structures
produced by the best basis search caused by the noise in the
subbands tend to detoriate the results.
In general, we observe a significant tradeoﬀ between se-
curity and visual quality of compressed data when compar-
ing the diﬀerent settings as investigated. Increasing the num-
ber of iterations up to a certain level increases security but
decreases compression performance (this is especially true
for the Baker map which requires a higher number of iter-
ations in general to achieve reasonable security). However, of
course the computational eﬀort increases as well.
We face an even more significant tradeoﬀ when increas-
ing security further: the 3D extensions already strongly de-
crease image quality whereas diﬀusion entirely destroys the
capability of compressing encrypted visual data. When the
security level approaches the security of cryptographically
strong ciphers like AES, also CMs do not oﬀer robustness
against lossy compression any longer.
6. CONCLUSION
CM behaves diﬀerently with respect to robustness against
transmission errors depending on the nature of errors.
Whereas CM has turned out to be extremely robust in case
of value errors, the opposite is true for buﬀer errors. If pixel
values change, the errors remain restricted to the aﬀected
pixels even after decryption whereas missing or added pix-
els entirely destroy the synchronization of the CM schemes.
The observed robustness against value errors also explains
the unique property to tolerate a medium amount of lossy
compression which is an exceptional property not found in
other ciphers. Applying the Cat map with 5 iterations or the
Baker map with 20 iterations provides a certain degree of se-
curity and decrypted images show acceptable image quality
even after significant JPEG compression.
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Figure 15: Mean PSNR versus file size of 16 diﬀerent test images under varying using JPEG, JPEG 2000, and JPEG 2000 compression with
wavelet packets.
However, the statements about robustness only apply
if CM is used without diﬀusion step (i.e., in a less secure
mode). If diﬀusion is added, robustness against transmission
value errors and compression is entirely lost. Even in case
only the 3D extension technique is used, robustness is sig-
nificantly reduced.
As long as a lower security level is acceptable (i.e., diﬀu-
sion is omitted), classical block ciphers like AES may be com-
plemented by CM block ciphers in case of value errors in an
eﬃcient manner (computational demand is much lower and
robustness to transmission value errors is higher). Also, lossy
compression may be applied in the encrypted domain to a
certain extent which is not at all possible with classical ci-
phers. If high security is required, it is better to stick to clas-
sical block ciphers in any environment.
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